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Written evidence from the Durham Company Law Project (CGV0029)
Executive Summary
(Recommendations with legislative implications are shown in bold type)
 The success of the company should be understood as the success of the business 
enterprise which it conducts.
 Qualifying employees should be recognised by statute as members of the 
company and any group that employs them. The company can then be understood 
as the legal reflection of the human community of enterprise that produces goods and 
services and serves customers and society as a whole. Deemed employee membership 
would empower directors to pursue the success of the enterprise in which long-term 
shareholders and workers have a common interest. Without it, s. 172 is a dead letter.
 Such recognition would not be sufficient without some transfer of sovereignty over 
takeover decisions from shareholders to directors and workers. Directors need to be 
free to pursue the success of the enterprise without the threat of hostile takeover. 
Furthermore, since an enterprise may be worth more to shareholders dead than alive, 
the consent of workers as well as of long-term shareholders should be required 
for takeovers recommended by the directors.
 The election of worker directors follows naturally from the recognition of deemed 
membership and this understanding of success helps to overcome the conflicts of 
interest. Trade unions should play a complementary but separate role.
The Durham Company Law Project Steering Group
The Durham Company Law Project is a project of Durham University Business School 
(www.dur.ac.uk/business) and the Centre for Catholic Social Thought and Practice 
(www.ccstp.org.uk). Its purpose and the reason for this submission is to draw on Catholic 
Social Thought to inform the reform of company law.
Nick Deeming has over 25 years’ experience as a lawyer and businessman, the majority of it 
at the heart of global and listed organisations, including Transocean, Christie’s and BOC. He 
currently holds a number of non executive director positions, he is a senior executive coach 
and he is a senior advisor to A Blueprint for Better Business.
Maurice Glasman is an English academic, social thinker and Labour life peer in the House of 
Lords. He is Director of the Common Good Foundation.
Mark Hayes was until recently St Hilda Reader in Catholic Social Thought and Practice and 
is now an Honorary Fellow in the Department of Theology and Religion at Durham 
University. He is an economist with a background in finance, as an investment manager at 3i, 
and as principal founder and Managing Director of Shared Interest, a financial co-operative 
supporting the Fair Trade movement. He has acted as the primary draftsman of this 
submission.
Clifford Longley is an author, broadcaster and journalist who has specialised since 1972 in 
the coverage and analysis of British and international religious affairs. He currently has a 
column in The Tablet, of which he is also Editorial Consultant. He has written extensively on 
Catholic Social Thought and is a Trustee of the Centre for Catholic Social Thought and 
Practice.
Geoff Moore is Professor of Business Ethics at Durham University Business School. His 
areas of work include corporate social responsibility, stakeholder theory, corporate moral 
agency and Fair Trade. His particular  area of interest is around the application of moral 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s virtue ethics approach to organisations.
The members of the Steering Group make this submission in their personal capacities and the 
views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of any organisation with which they are 
associated.
1Terms of Reference – Points Addressed
Directors Duties
 Is the duty to promote the long-term success of the company clear and enforceable?
 How are the interests of shareholders, current and former employees best balanced?
Composition of Boards
 Should there be worker representation on boards and/or remuneration committees? If 
so, what form should this take?
Is the duty to promote the long-term success of the company clear and enforceable?
1. The key issues are a confusion between ‘the company’ and ‘the enterprise’ and the 
need for statutory recognition of employees as deemed members of the company.
2. The Company Law Review (CLR, 1999, chapter 5), which led to the Companies Act 
2006, tends to use the words ‘enterprise’ and ‘company’ interchangeably. Lord 
Denning held that the duty of directors “was to do their best to promote its business 
and to act with complete good faith towards it” in a context where the interests of the 
controlling shareholders conflicted with those of the company’s business and minority 
shareholders.1 The CLR recognised that the interests of shareholders and employees 
would clash in the case of the closure of a plant and wrote “An appeal to the ‘interests 
of the company’ will not resolve the issue, unless it is first decided whether ‘the 
company’ is to be equated with its shareholders alone (enlightened shareholder value), 
or the shareholders plus other participants (pluralism)” (CLR, 1999, p. 39). Yet in the 
following paragraphs the CLR argues for legislation – that clearly issued in s. 172 CA 
2006 – “to ensure that directors recognise their obligation to have regard to the need, 
where appropriate, to build long-term and trusting relationships with employees, 
suppliers, customers and others, as appropriate, in order to secure the success of the 
enterprise over time” (CLR, 1999, pp. 41–42, emphasis added).
3. For the CLR the enterprise is not bounded by the limits of the actual business of a 
particular company at any time but includes the business of any potential acquiring 
company, which may find it profitable to make:
cost savings in the form of redundancies, or plant closures, and may involve the 
transfer of corporate headquarters. Such changes may also be very unwelcome to the 
directors of the target company in question. Under the present law and practice 
directors are prevented by the ‘proper purpose’ principle, and, in the case of takeover 
offers for public companies resident in the UK, by the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, from exercising their powers in a way which frustrates the bid. (CLR, 1999, 
p. 47)
1 Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324.
24. The CLR is thus enabled to interpret the success of the enterprise solely in terms of 
shareholder value. Having adopted that criterion, there is no difference between, on 
the one hand, merging the target enterprise into a larger continuing enterprise and, on 
the other, closing the target enterprise, transferring its sales, brand value and other 
assets elsewhere or simply eliminating the competition; provided that the share price 
is acceptable to the shareholders in either case.
5. Nevertheless the distinction, between a business, trade or profession (the ‘enterprise’) 
and the person (including a company) that conducts the enterprise, is important. A 
company can conduct a number of different enterprises and an enterprise can be 
conducted by an individual or unincorporated partnership. This distinction is fully 
recognised, capable of legal definition and of considerable importance in tax law.
6. The interests of employees and long-term shareholders in the success of a particular 
enterprise are for the most part aligned, in a manner that does not necessarily apply to 
other stakeholders, with whom there is greater scope for conflicts of interest. Both 
employees and long-term shareholders can benefit from the success of the enterprise 
without doing so at the expense of the other. The conflict arises if the enterprise is not 
successful or one group seeks to gain at the other’s expense. Workers cannot 
legitimately expect shareholders to fund continuing losses. Shareholders cannot 
legitimately expect workers to accept (at least, without substantial compensation) the 
loss of their livelihoods from a viable enterprise, which is worth more to the 
shareholders dead than alive.
7. The recognition of workers as members of the company is a necessary condition for 
the sustainability of adopting a corporate purpose beyond shareholder value. At one 
level this is relatively straightforward. Legislation could provide that qualifying 
employees are members of the company which employs them, and of any parent 
company and its parent, all the way up to the ultimate holding company. In itself 
this provision would provide no rights to vote or participate in management or profits, 
yet this would be the first step in recognising the intrinsic membership of workers in 
the community of enterprise of which they are part.
8. In the context of s. 172, such deemed membership would require the directors to 
pursue the benefit of workers as part of the ‘members as a whole’ and ‘acting fairly  
as between members of the company’ – which broadly means not pursuing the benefit 
of either group at the expense of the other. Membership would also provide the 
platform for a derivative claim under s. 260 CA 2006 so that workers could challenge 
the directors’ interpretation or performance of their duties. Without deemed worker 
membership, s. 172 is a dead letter.
9. There would be considerable work for the Parliamentary draftsmen in defining a 
qualifying employee. No definition would be perfect yet the problem is surely not 
insurmountable for practical purposes. Account would need to be taken of length of 
service and hours of work (a short qualifying period and minimum hours seem 
3reasonable; the practices of the John Lewis Partnership, for example, provide 
guidance) and in particular of indirect employment, which has become very 
significant through the use of various forms of service company and contractor to 
reduce the obligations to workers. HMRC has become very adept in distinguishing 
employment from self-employment; the key element is the identification of who 
ultimately benefits from and controls an individual’s working time. There is a 
parallel case for limiting the franchise to long-term shareholders as defined by 
the carpet-bagger defences of mutual and co-operative institutions.
10. However, the question of purpose cannot be separated from the market for corporate 
control, addressed below. It is possible that remedies in that area alone would in 
themselves be sufficient to overcome the ambiguity of s. 172 and allow the ‘success 
of the company’ to be interpreted by the courts as ‘the success of the business 
enterprise carried on by the company’. It would put the matter beyond doubt if the 
six extra words (or better wording to similar effect) were inserted into the 
primary legislation.2
11. Even if directors were enabled to see their duty in terms of the success of the business 
enterprise, rather than shareholder value alone, the meaning of success would remain 
undefined. There remains a case for a statement of the purpose of the business against 
which success might be judged. The question is whether this statement of purpose 
should have legal force, in the same way as the Objects clause of a memorandum of 
association. The requirement of an objects clause was abolished by CA 2006 as 
redundant in the light of previous changes in the law to place a company’s capacity 
beyond challenge as ultra vires. Such clauses had become compendious with a view 
to covering every imaginable contingency. It is likely that the re-introduction of such 
a requirement, albeit for different reasons, would run into the same problem. 
Furthermore precedent suggests that the courts are reluctant to challenge judgements 
made by directors about the conduct of a business, however defined. It must also be 
acknowledged that the creation of deemed employee membership would not directly 
address the possibility of a conflict between the interests of the enterprise 
(encompassing those of both long-term shareholders and workers) and those of non-
member stakeholders. A statement of purpose would be better left to the discretion of 
the directors, while noting that it might be expected that an enterprise should be able 
to articulate how it contributes to the common good.
How are the interests of shareholders, current and former employees best balanced?
12. The CLR recognised that “one of the most important influences on the behaviour of 
directors and members is the market in corporate control” (CLR, 1999, p. 34). This 
strictly economic rather than legal factor cannot be neglected when considering 
director’s duties and corporate purpose. The surest way for directors to lose their 
office and any employment is in consequence of a hostile takeover. Personal interest 
2 Such an amendment would also clarify that s. 172 does not create a duty to avoid tax, which cannot have been 
the intention of Parliament.
4aside, the UK legal framework and the culture and practice of the City prohibits 
directors from blocking a hostile bid by one of the many devices common in the US, 
and regards as absolute the sovereignty of shareholders over the disposal of their 
property, namely the shares in a company, subject only to a limited understanding of 
the public interest in terms of national security and competition policy. It is only to be 
expected that the interests of shareholders will rank paramount in the minds of 
directors as they consider s. 172. This factor has become ever stronger as technology 
has made equity markets more and more liquid, shareholding periods shorter and 
shorter, and hedge funds more and more powerful. The share register can change 
dramatically within days of the initial offer and become dominated by those with a 
purely short-term financial interest.
13. There is no prospect of a sustainable commitment by a public company to a corporate 
purpose other than enlightened shareholder value (and perhaps not even enlightened, 
as many critics point out) without the prohibition of the hostile takeover.3 This is 
another pre-condition of change, alongside the recognition of qualifying employees as 
members. For directors to be able to pursue the success of the actual enterprise for 
which they are responsible, as opposed to the interests of shareholders, they must 
have the discretion to make an impartial judgement in the terms of s. 172. Thus any 
takeover offer should, at the very least, be recommended by the board of directors.
14. If the company is understood as a legal reflection of the community of persons 
engaged in the enterprise, even the prohibition of the hostile takeover is not sufficient. 
Boards may recommend a takeover as in the interests of shareholders without outside 
pressure and even if this is not in the interests of the company’s continuing business 
enterprise. This implies that the minimal rights of the employee member, in 
addition to being considered a member for the purposes of s. 172, should include 
the approval of any takeover recommended by the Board.4 
15. There are many occasions when workers will approve a takeover, even if this involves 
redundancies for some or all of them. A struggling business has few options and its 
workers usually understand this better than anyone. A merger with a larger business 
may make strategic sense. They may even approve the closure of a viable enterprise 
when an offer is too good to refuse, provided that an appropriate share of the benefit 
flows to them.
16. This last option should strictly not be recommended by the directors as it deprives 
future generations of the opportunity to participate in the enterprise, in the same way 
that demutualisation removes the opportunity to participate in a more socially-
3 This may not be so much a question of a prohibition as of a removal of the duties imposed by the Takeover 
Code in its present form. The Code might be limited to the conduct of recommended takeovers (i.e. 
recommended by the Board) including the requirement for employee consent here proposed.
4 This would also require amendment of s. 168 CA 2006 accordingly to limit the exclusive right of shareholders 
to remove directors. Each proposal in this submission will require detailed drafting including consequential 
amendments.
5oriented enterprise. In practice, without an external public interest test, it would be 
hard to prohibit a takeover approved by both shareholders and workers, if only 
because there would be no change in legal form as in the case of demutualisation.
Should there be worker representation on boards and/or remuneration committees? If so, 
what form should this take?
17. With the market in corporate control limited in the above fashion, there is some 
chance of the emergence of a different understanding of corporate purpose. Room is 
created for a sense of vocation and a genuine (rather than purely instrumental) 
commitment to excellence of practice. While the above conditions are necessary and 
may be sufficient, further measures are desirable. First of all, the advocates of the 
market in corporate control (CLR, 1999, p. 45) will argue that without the discipline 
of the threat of hostile takeover, boards of directors become, in practice, 
unaccountable. It is certainly true that alternative channels for corporate governance 
would need strengthening and developing, including both the engagement of long-
term shareholders and the representation of workers.
18. The argument of this submission so far has been for the minimum recognition of 
intrinsic employee membership necessary to enable directors to pursue wider 
corporate purpose. A powerful case can be made for going much further in terms of 
worker participation in corporate governance and management, not least in terms of 
worker motivation and productivity. This would involve the solution of a number of 
complex issues, including the reconciliation of one vote per employee with one vote 
per share, perhaps through separate meetings as with different classes of share. A 
decision on a recommended takeover should probably be made by secret ballot. An 
ultimate goal might be the introduction of co-determination along the lines of the 
German model. All this would require a gradual and incremental change of UK 
industrial culture and practice.
19. The concept of deemed employee membership adds a new ingredient to the debate 
over worker representation. It provides legal recognition of the human association 
which produces goods and services and serves customers and wider society. It 
provides grounds in terms of the well-established legal principles of association for 
participation in governance. From membership follows accountability, including 
general meetings and the election of directors.
20. The duty of a director elected by workers would be to the company, as in the case of 
any other director. With the above suggested clarification of the meaning of success 
of the company as relating to the business enterprise, the Board could be unified in 
pursuit of this objective, in the creation of value for the community as a whole. There 
would be no more conflict of interest between the interests of workers and of the 
company than exists in the case of executive directors. Under this proposed regime, 
excessive pay awards would be as unlikely for workers as for executives; present 
6problems with executive pay reflect the current understanding of success in terms of 
shareholder value.
21. The role of the trade union is complementary. The duty of a trade union is to its 
members, not to the company. Worker directors should not be directly appointed by 
trade unions yet neither should trade union officials or members be disqualified from 
holding office as a director, any more than shareholder representatives. The trade 
union could play a key role in negotiation with the company in those areas, such as 
terms and conditions of employment, where worker directors experience a conflict of 
interest. Furthermore they could play a role similar to that of a political party in 
relation to members of Parliament, such as in the training and nomination of 
candidates for election to the Board.
25 October 2016
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